Issues of powẽr and control have been the chief considerations in the industrial relations of the SOEs so far . . This is not surprising. The setting up of the SOEs broke with organisational structures and accompanying industrial felations and personnel arrangements that had developed over at least 75 years. Trade unions and management had adjusted structurally and operationally to those arrangements and their relations with each other had been moulded within them. Their rẽlations were of a continuing nature in which present outcomes were shaped by past practices. Union and management organisation, membership and management attitudes and actions, political and ẽconomic considerations, statutory pfescription and tribunal interpretation had foirued a configuration from which came a particular balance of industrial forces. This varied across time, sector and issues. Corporatisation altefed that configuration. It changẽd the nature of its components and it weighted them differently. This was not a neutral intervention. By replacing past practices with radically new ones, the Government disrupted the existing balance of forces and opened the door to a struggle for power and control in the new corporations. This paper is an initial effort to chart the frrst year of that struggle.
Issues of powẽr and control have been the chief considerations in the industrial relations of the SOEs so far . . This is not surprising. The setting up of the SOEs broke with organisational structures and accompanying industrial felations and personnel arrangements that had developed over at least 75 years. Trade unions and management had adjusted structurally and operationally to those arrangements and their relations with each other had been moulded within them. Their rẽlations were of a continuing nature in which present outcomes were shaped by past practices. Union and management organisation, membership and management attitudes and actions, political and ẽconomic considerations, statutory pfescription and tribunal interpretation had foirued a configuration from which came a particular balance of industrial forces. This varied across time, sector and issues. Corporatisation altefed that configuration. It changẽd the nature of its components and it weighted them differently. This was not a neutral intervention. By replacing past practices with radically new ones, the Government disrupted the existing balance of forces and opened the door to a struggle for power and control in the new corporations. This paper is an initial effort to chart the frrst year of that struggle. One would nonnally expect the early period of new types of organisations like the SOEs to be marked by a struggle for control between unions and managẽment. This expectation is enhanced when one considers the policy objectives of corporatisation and the circumstances in which the SOEs were established. Corporatisation is an early and striking example of the Government's wjder programme of state restructuring which has . becomẽ a key aspect of its economic policy and whose pace has quickened remarkably since 1985 . It is not an exaggeration to say that the role of the state has become the central political question in New Zealand. In the frrst half of 1988 alone, the State Sector Act, the Gibbs and Picot ~eports, the Royal Commission on Social Policy and major reviews of several Government departments have an spoken to different dimẽnsions of this. In this context, corporatisation was important because it established a particular way of thinking about the appropriate role of the state . . Since then, the principles which underpinned this havẽ bid fair to become the new orthodoxy in social and economic policy.
At the heart of the corporatisation model of the state is a set of arguments about the allocation, deployment and assessment of resources, including human resources, that havẽ significant relevance for industrial relations. The economic justification for corporatisation centered on the claimed inefficiencies of state trading enterprises as they werẽ constituted prior to 1987 . The full arguments in support of this position are well-known (TJieasury, 1984; Gregory, 1987) . Both the diagnosis and the recommended solution implied major industrial relations change. This stemmed immediately from ' the statutory requirement that the SOEs be run as successful businesses in which commercia). criteria wẽre to • predominate in all decisions. Managerial autonomy and accountability werẽ elevated to the • forefront and managerial perfounance was to be measured against the yardstick of • maximum efficiency in the allocation of resources. Behind this lay the argument that efficiency had been impeded in the past by restrictive practices, either imposed by unions or agreed to by weak management, and by a burdensome set of personnel and wage-fixing rules which inhibited managerial performance. To this end the personnel and industrial · relations arrangements of the state sector were no longer legislatively mandated for the new corporations. ' Thus. , corporatisation had as one important policy agenda the reassertion of managerial control in the workplace.
The circumstances in which the corporatisation policy was developed also made it mo~e likely that control would be a central issue in the SOEs. There were three elements to this. One was the dominant role by Treasury in promoting corporatisation over the opposition of the State Services Commission (Gregory, 1987, p.ll3) . ' The second was the exclusion of the state unions from influential involvement in the process. The third was the appointn1ent to the Establishment Boards of private sector employers, many of them members of the Business Roundtable. Together, these three factors clarified the character of the coalition pushing for corporatisation and the links between it and wider economic policy concerns. In particular, it clarified corporatisation's c.onnection with ideas of labour market deregulation in both the private and state sectors. An important aspect of that agenda is a denial of the legitimacy of trade unions and a determination to restofe the primacy of management in the workplace. Promotion of that agenda necessarily poses the issue of control. The . analys. is in this paper is premised on the view that managerial rather than union initiatives provide the key to industrial relations in ' the first year of the SOEs. This does • not derive from a belief in union weakness but from an assessment of the structural and political circumstances surrounding the establishment of the corporations. They are new
organisations set up to fealise specific policy objectives to do with managerial efficiency • and performance. New organisational and management structurẽs were introduced, significant changẽs were made in operational practices within the corporations, and in many cases new personnel were appointed. Established industrial relations procedurẽs were discarded in favour of a new regime based on markedly dif~erent rules and procedures. Moreover, unlike the State Sector Act, the SOE Act did not carry over any conditions of • employment; all had to be negotiated afresh under radically different circumstances. Similarly, political factors handed the advantage to management. The members of the corporation boanls and senior management, especially chief ẽxẽcutives, were appointed in circumstances which raised expectations with regard to managerial initiatives. They were a new blieed of private sector managers brought in to remedy the inefficiencies of the past and to make the SOEs viable, ẽven profitable commeficial enterprises. Their reputations and that of the Government were thought to be at least partly dependent on their • implementation of innovative and commercially successful policies. The impetus for change cam, e from the management side of the fence; it is therefore to be expected that managẽment initiatives will establish the framework ~or industrial relations in the first year of operation. Nonetheless, despite the broadly similar forces at work, there has been considerable variation in the industrial relations strategies adopted by management in the six SOEs in this study. At a g, eneral level, and mindful of the risk of over-simplification, it appears that they fall into 3 categories. All 6 have sought to assert managerial control. The variation stems from the degree to which the con' trol strategies they have chosen peuuit the development of good working relations with the trade unions which represent their employees. Forestrycorp and Electricorp havẽ chosen strategies which have made it exceedingly difficult to devẽlop satisfactory relations with their unions. Strategies followed by Postbank and Airways have had mixed implications for relations with unions, both jeopardising and encouraging them. In contrast, NZ Post and Telecom appear to have given higher priority than the other four to the development of good union relations. This categorisation is not immutable. Õn particular issues, the corporations may not fall into this hieruchy, whilst over time, a corporation may shift strategies and become more or less antagonistic towards trade unions. At present, there is some evidence suggesting that Telecom is adopting a mme adversarial stance towards the Post Office Union than was the case over the first 12 months.
Thus, it is apparent that accounting ~or the industrial relations differences among the new corporations may be as important and as interesting a task as pointing to the broad patterns established in the first year of their operation. The 6 were established at the same time, for the same reasons, and as part of the same overall policy. And yet, divergent industrial relations practices became visible within the frrst year. Why? At this stage, it is possible only to begin to sketch what a full answer to this question might look like. Much of the answer is not acc, essible and has to do with internal policy decisions at the highest level of the organisations. Time will permit more considered and infot 1ned judgements than those attempted here. , but the contemporary relevance is such that the issue can not be put to one side.
Electricorp and Forestrycorp appear to have had the clearest understanding of industrial relations as an .integral component of their corporate strategy. In each case, a policy decision was taken to establish an industrial relations regimẽ designed to maximise efficiency and thus profitability. This may be related to to the particular attitudes towards the role of trade unions held by Board members and senior management. In Electricorp's case, the new industrial relations approach became plainly visible after it was res~ctured. It may be expected that the current rẽstructuring in Telecom may produc, e similar outcomes, especially if a decision is made to follow the Electricorp line of independent competitive business units. · Past relations with unions have been important. NZ Post, Telecom and Postbank have profited from the historically good relations between the Post Office and the Post , Office Union. However, pfesent relations are at least partially dependent on how past relations are interpreted. Postbank appeared to view the joint consultation which occurred in the Post Office as spilling ovẽr into joint management and was detẽt 1nined not to start down that path. It is notable that its relations with the . POU have been more adversarial than those of the other two. As one example, it alone of the 3 rejected a union suggestion of joint working parties prior to negotiations to clarify positions and assist in reaching a settlement.
Union organisation and strength have materially influenced management strategiẽs. In the Post Õffice, industTial strength lay with workers now with either Telecom or NZ Post, but not with bank employees. Similarly, Fofestrycorp have sought to takẽ advantage of the relative industrial weakness of their ẽmployees. . Con¥ersely, as in Electricorp, industrial strength can also provide incentives for a control-oriented management to adopt • a rigorously uncompromising stance in an ef£ort to reverse the balance of forces. The degree of competition faced by an SOE has had an impact on its industrial relations policies. Forestrycorp faces direct and visible competition from other forestry companies and it is clear that this has strongly influenced its employee strategy. Postbank faces direct competitors, unlike NZ Post and Telecom, although the latter is alert to the implications of de-regulation and the possibility of future competition.
Negotiations in the SÕEs
Most SOEs havẽ now completed two rounds of negotiations. The frrst usuaUy resulted in a transitional determination promulgated under the State Services Conditions of Employment Act which took effect from April 1 1987. For the most part, the transitional deteuninations carried over existing conditions of employment. The main departures from the status quo were in the areas of union coverage and personnel procedures, bolh of which wiH be discussed below. Forestrycorp stood out in those negotiations. It adopted a characteristically control-oriented approach from the start. Forestrycorp was unusual among the SOEs in that it dealt with 3 unions. It concluded an agree. ment with the ' Timberworkers union based on longstanding relativity with the agreements in the other main forestry companies. It was unable to settle a transitional dete1 .rnination with · the NZ Workers union or the PSA. Forestrycorp believed that a number of state conditions of employmen~ including union coverage, were incompatible with its need to compete with its private sector rivals. Forestrycorp unilaterally issued a transitional determination to cover Workers union members on March 31 1987, and offered individual contracts of employment to PSA members. It took until May 1988 to conclude an agreement with the Workers union; the PSA agreement is still outstanding.
Other SOEs also had difficulty in settling their first actual agreement following their transitional detennination. These agreements were negotiated under the tenns of the Labour Relations Act. Of the SOEs in this study, Airways and Electricorp had the most problems. In neither case did wages constitute the difficulty. Indeed, the ẽmphasis upon issues r· elated to power and control meant that wagẽs and salariẽs were not contentious issues in the SOEs. The major difficulty in the wages area was the refusal of Airways to backdate its wage increase, a position upheld in mediation. The need to recruit and retain good staff predominated in wage negotiations, and aU the SOEs followed the trend set in t11e private sector. There had been some discussion prior to Lhc wage round that an SOE might become a trend-seuẽr, but this did not eventuate. The only departurc from the going rate was the 8.2 percent in Electricorp, which part1y followed the higher ẽlectricians' settlement in the private sector, but much more importantly was a trade-off for the PSA's acceptance of 7 separate agreements to cover Elcctricorp's 7 new business units . . I shall return to the Electricorp settlement below. There is increasing use throughout the SOEs of performance-based salary scales such as Hay or Price Waterhouse . . In future union advocates may find themselves negotiating over locations on such a scale. These may pose a potential problem for unions in that many union members see them as objective and support their use, whereas unions prefer a collective-based bargaining system.
There has been little substantial change in fotnaally prescribed national conditions of employment. The chief impetus for change has come from management reluctance to include particular local or administrative conditions in the national agreements. This has been an important issue in the currẽnt negotiations ~o consolidate the 7 Electricorp documents. One area where there has been change is equal employment opportunity, and that is examined separately below. Other than Forestrycorp, Airways was the only corporation to mount an attack on specific ẽmployment conditions. Their campaign to alter the basis of shift fOSters resulted in the corporation gaining the right to implement new procedures if it chooses to do so, a result consistent with the new stress on managerial discretion. In this context, day-to-day conditions of employment have undergone change, as management has sought to establish unquestioned control at the • workplace itself.
Union cove: rage Struggles over power and control in New Zealand industrial relations have not usually involved the · issue of union coverage. One reason is that management has had little structural opportunity to involve itself in the matter. Indeed, it has historically been a matter resolvẽd not by the parties themselves but by others. In the state sector, union coverage has been settled politically, by means of Ministerial recognition, while in the privatẽ sector the legislatively-prescribed registration process has settled the issue administrativẽly . . Such disputes as there have been over union coverage hav, e tended to be inter-union demarcation disputes rather than union/management conflicts. The nature of the industrial relations system, which had at its centlie the resolution of disputes by representativẽ organisations of unions and employers, also discouraged employers from questioning the system of union coverage, as did the pragmatic acceptance by most employers of the necessary role played by unions.
The setting up of the SOEs of£ered an opportunity to break with that pattern. Unlike most management in taking over an existing entel])rise or establishing a new one, the management of the SOBs did not inherit an established system of union coverage. It was an unsettled issue, both in terms of which unions, if any, would have coverage, and the level at which coverage would apply.
Policy objectives converged with structural opportunity. Many of those appointed to senior management and the Establishment Boards shared the view that the historically poor performance of state trading enterprises was attributable to weak management and strong unions. They were detennined to reverse this. Added to this was the articulation of a new managẽrial antagonism to the very principle of trade unionism, which found expression among some of the SOE appointees. This fepresented a significant departure from traditional managerial ideology in New Zealand, and can be traced partly to the increasingly important role in industrial relations played by chief executives and the loss of predominance by the more pragmatic industrial relations professionals. This itself derives from a variety of causes related to the restructuring of the economy.
There was some SÕE rẽsistance to the principle of union coverage and delayed Ministerial recognition of the PSA in Electricorp, the first to settle the union coverage principle. In practice, the focus shifted to the level of covẽrage. All SOEs tried to minimise the scope of union coverage, thus ẽnhancing managerial control. In general, most began from a position of wanting to confine coverage to positions with salaries below the coverage level in the Clerical Workers' award. This was entirely unacceptable to the unions as it ' Would havẽ deprived them of a significant proportion of their membership . . In ' the case of Postbank, for instance, the loss would have been about 30 percent. The issue was settled by specifying a set of senior managerial positions exempt from union coverage. The coverage loss has not been great. It is less than 3 percent in the three corporations covered by the Post Office Union; while for those covered by the PSA, the loss appears to have varied between 5 and 15 percent. The stfongest resistance to retention of high levels of union coverage was in Forestrycorp, where PSA coverage remains very low, and in Electricorp. All the SOEs place great emphasis upon direct communication with their e· mployees over the heads of the unions, in an eftort to shift workers' loyalty away from the union to the corporation.
• The Iiesolution of the union coverage issue should not be regarded as final. In many of the SOEs, management is unhappy at the outcome so far, and views the current position as negotiable in the future renewal of agfeements. The main management thrust so far has been on personnel matters, to which we shall turn in a moment. To some degree, management success there, which was considerable, was trnded off against union coverage. But · there can be no doubt that in some SOEs, unions will soon be faced with balancing particular conditions of employment against union cov· erage levels. The union coverage status quo is better than in the private sector. Management in the SOEs place great store by equivalence with the private sector, and this, combined with the ideological and policy reasons mentioned above should ensure that union coverage remains a central industrial relations issue in the corporations.
Managerial prerogatives
There has been a consistent and uniform drive by SOE management to restore managerial discretion in all areas. The personnel procedures in the State Services Act 1962 became a key target in all SOEs. Existing statutory provisions with regard to merit appoinUnents, appeals, promotions, transfers, classification, grading and tennination wer· e , eliminated and replaced by provisions giving management vastly increased discretion. The statutory requirement to be a good employer in section 4 of the SOE Act did not prẽvent this. Sweeping away the state services personnel procedures (now removed there too) was seen as essential both to managerial authority and to being a com. mercially profitable enterprise. There appears to have been no significant union resistance to this. These are difficult issues on \vhich to mobilise members, especially given the general strategic weakness of the unions. The personnel provisions of the State Services Act were an integral part of the suucture of a non-political career service. The removal of the SOEs from this context robbed unions of much of the justification for their retention.
The personnel provisions of the State Services Act should be seen as equal opportunity measures, as was made plain in the debate over the State Sector Act in 1988. Their elimination has significant implications for the redrẽss of employment inequality. Although the SOEs' statutory requirement to be a good employer includes the implementation of an equal opportunity programme, the corporations have not so far been notable for including progressive EEO policies in their induslrial agreements. The overall picture is complex, but some issues are clear. Most of the SOEs have reduced maternity leave conditions to the provisions of the Pa.fental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 which are inferior in important fespects to those in the public service; theJie is little if any commitment to support for setting up child-care centres for SOE staff; sick leave and domestic leave condi Lions are worse in some cases; and, there is little evidence of carrying over either the Maori and Pacific Islander recruitment programmes or the equality n1anag· ement programmes. Other EEO provisions such as pcrn1anent part-time work, flexible working hours and berẽavernent leave (including tangihangi leave) arẽ often worded in such a way as to give managẽment much greater discretion in their implementation. Equal employment opportunity measures are seen as limiting Lhe capacity of management lO tum the SOBs into con1mercial profit centrẽs. ' They too have been a casualty of the managerial drive for the reassertion of control.
• Once again, it is difficult for unions to mobilise their · members on these issues and it is ẽvident that existing EEO provisions are lik· ely to be targeted by the SOEs in the next round of negotiations. Already, influential commentators are preparing the ideological ground for such an attack (Jennings and Cameron, 1987, p.151) . The policy implications are that under the present balance of industrial forces, · equal opportunity measures requirẽ both statutory protection in the for. m of specific entitlements and enforcement mechanisms. Both are lacking in the SOEs. It remains to be seen whether the situation w.ill develop diffierently in the state services under the State Sector Act, where the enforcement role of the State Services Commission is considerable.
Consultation was an important area where the issue of . managerial pre~ogativẽ was posed sharply. The changes in this area appear to be most visible in Electricorp and in the three corporations that have emerged from the Post Office. As government departments, these organisations had a centralised, highly consultativ· e and cooperative decision-making process in which the unions enjoyed considerable influence. In the SOEs, management has tried to diminish union influence over decisions by moving decisively away from a genuinely consultatiV:e approach, although, as we shall see, the~e is some variation in the degree to which this has happened.
In Electricorp, this rejection of consultation was expressed in a bitter conflict over job losses. In September 1987, Electricorp had completed its restructuring process which had fallen behind schedule. It decided that it needed to shed 800 positions, which itself breached its earlier agreement with the PS A that there would be no substantial job losses. On its own admission, Electricorp was deteuuined not to enter negotiations with the PSA on the issue, and only grudgingly was it prepared to peunit its local managers to engage in a very restricted ~orm of consultation with the PSA. This led directly to notice of industrial action. Electricorp then secured an ex parte injunction against the PSA, which curtailed the planned action. The injunction was based on Electricorp's claim that the PSA's advice on its proposals to minimise the impact of the action in fact constituted a breach of the notice of action. In turn, the PSA obtained its own injunction against Electricorp binding it to the tet1ns of their agreement. Neither .injunction went to a full hearing, and the issue was disposed of by an administrative agreement
The significance of the dispute was two-fold. At one level, it concerned Electricorp's decentralisation of authority to local managers and the PSA's reaction to that. We shall return to this below. At another level, its significance lay in the importance Electricorp attached to not negotiating with the PSA over job losses and in being seen not to negotiate. Eleclricorp regarded the dispute as an opportunity to establish that its management policies would differ substantially from those of its predecessor, the New Zealand Electricity Department (NZED). ' This was made plain by the manner in which it took the injunction against the pfoposed industrial action. In the past, industrial action by electricity staff had normally been directed against the Government (as in the derecognition disputes of 1979 and 1983) or the State Services Commision rather than against NZED itself. This reflected the centralisation of industrial rẽlations under the previous regime and the limited role played by the department. In those circumstances the PSA and NZED had cooperated to minimise the impact of the action. This had involved staff staying on the job and being paid while limiting production but not distribution and thus not affecting the consumer. In this case, Electricorp, as the target of the action. , decided it would not cooperate as its predecessor had done, and that it would exploit the offer of cooperation to secure the injunction. M: oreovẽr, it decided to Jiefuse to pay workers during the limited action that did take place, while gambling that they would not walk off the job.
Whatever ethical reservations individual Electricorp managers may havẽ had about these strategies-and there is some suggestion that not all were entirely happy with themthey were seen as crucial to distingush Electricorp management polices from. those of its predecessor. Eleclricorp management believes that its conduct of the dispute showed its own managers, its Board, its ẽmployees and the PSA that it was deteunined to control the operation of the corporation. It was important for Electricorp that this be done early and with conviction. In that sense, the dispute served important managerial purposes and clarified Electricorp's expectations about power relations in the corporation. The other side of the dispute is the impact it had on employee rẽlations and the manner in which it embittered those difectly involved from the electricity group and from the staff of the PSA. This may have significant long-teun consequences, but these were not important policy concerns for Electricorp at the time.
The shift away from consultative managẽment has been apparent in Postbank, Telecom and NZ Post also. The Post Õffice operated with an · elaborate network of joint union/management consultative arrangements. Indeed to outsiders, the Post Office appeared to constitute a r· emarkable example of power-sharing. One obvious spin-off of this was the industrial harmony that prevailed there. However, under corporatisation. , these arrangements were viewed as a major contributor to the claimed inefficiencies of the Post Office and as a reason for corporatisation. They soon became a natural target for the new management and have in fact been eliminated in all 3 corporations. However, as noted earlier, the 3 vary considerably in the extent to which they continue the practice of cooperation depending on their interpretation of the meaning of the joint consultation procedures of the past Decentralisation of managerial authority A key developmẽnt in all the SOEs has been the decentralisation of managerial authority. (There is some suggestion that Airways Corporation is in the process of recentralising authority, but if so this process is only in the very early stages.) Before corporatisation, decision-making, including industrial relations and personnel matters, was highly centralised. Decentralisation poses a challenge to both union and management . structures. For management, the challenge in many SOEs has been to develop its own · industrial relations management. In the past, the now-corporatised govẽrnment deparunents were able to downgrade the importance of industrial and personnel skills, since the SSC made the major, and even tbe minor decisions in these aJieas. This is no longer the case. The need to bring in new management, including some from the private sector unaware of past practices and, if made aware, unsympathetic to those that varied from the private sector, has hastened the process of change, especially in terms of establishing a private sector-oriented model of management control. It is significant that this process of change has been least dramatic in the 3 corporations drawn from the Post Office, which had a well-developed industrial relations management structure.
The other challenge posed for management by the decentralisation of authority was to changẽ the attitudes of regional and local management who were accustomed to exercising little autonomy and to referring issues back to the centre . . ' This clashed with the ẽmphasis upon decentralised, accountable, perfotntance-oriented · managẽment. In the Post Õffice, management had also been able to take refuge in the processes of joint consultation and to avoid making decisions in cases whelie the union's view had not been established. This has raised the question of how successfully and responsibly local management are exẽrcising their new authority. Inevitably, the pictufe is mixed and the evidence so far is anecdotal only. Some union officials suggest that there has been a marked increase in dismissals and other disciplinary measures, but the evidence is not conclusive. Other union officials have remarked, with some sympathy, upon the great pressures placed upon local management under the new policies and the stress generated for them by the relentless emphasis upon performance. On the other hand, SOE management appeared aware of the tu1 n1oil that corporatisation had involvẽd for middle management at the local level and concerned to minimise its impact For unions, the challenge posed by the decentralisation of managerial authority has been significant. Their structures had devẽloped historically to meet corresponding management structures and the location of management decisions. At the same time these State-owned ẽntẽrprises 187 structures shaped and were shaped by the fact that union/management bargaining generated nationally uniform outcomes. Accordingly, state unions had developed quite differently from their private sector counterparts. Above all they were national in structure and centralised in operation. The sudden management shift away from this and perhaps also from national conditions of employment demanded an organisational response of the
The decentralisation process has gone furthest in Electricorp, which has restructured itself into 7 autono. mous business units. Electricorp regarded the securing of 7 separate agreements to cover the business units as vital to its rẽstructuring process. To secure the 7 agreemen'ls, Electricorp was · willing to carry over existing conditions of employment from the transitional deteunination, to offer an above-average wage settlement and to take industrial action from the PSA without seeking any restraining injunctions. One reason for the lack of injunctions was that in response to the earlier injunction the PSA has now become scrupulously legalistic in its notices of industrial action. The other was that in this case, unJiJc, e the dispute over job losses, a mutually satisfactory settlement was one of Electricorp' •s objectiv, es.
For the PSA and the electricity group in particular, devolution and fragmentation appeaiied to threaten the basis of their power which had always operated at a national level and in tetn1s of the electricity group as a whole. In practice, the impact would depend upon the strategic resources of workers in the different units, and it is difficult to predict this with confidence, although it does appear that in some units resources would be limited. Clearly, the existence of 7 agreements raises the possibility of diffe~ent conditions of employment in the 7 units. In all SOEs, as in the state services since the State Secoor Act, there is theoretical potential ~or departure from nationalconditions of employment within the same organisation.
Unions have begun the organisational changes needed to adapt to these structural changes in management decision-making. The Post Office Union, which was previously highly centralised in its operations, has had to shitt staff .resources from its central office out to the regions to cope with the new decision-making patterns. The PSA has always placed more emphasis upon its regional structure, at least in te1ms of its full-time officials, whilst giving rather less of a role to local and regional elected officials, reflected in the anachronism of a (soon to be abolished) , entirẽly Wellington-based Executive Committee. The PSA is undergoing a major organisational review at present, and corporatisation has been an additional factor, although a significant one, to be considered in that process. For all unions caught up in corporatisation, the decentralisation of managerial authority has reinfoJiCed the importance of developing an infottned and trained delegate structure, effective communication structures and internally democratic procedures which ensure responsiveness to members' needs. The new management structures put an end to any notions that the national union office is best placed to know about important developments and to articulate the policies most appropriate to deal with them. The possibility of varying conditions and policies being followed in different regions and organisational units means that traditional assumptions about national unifotanity have to be ' I The trade union rẽsponse to the new environment introduced by corporatisation has been subject to frequent criticism. Much of this criticism comes from opposing vested interests and can be appropriately discou1uvd. Õther arguments warrant more serious consideration. These centre on whether the unions responded to corporatisation in ' Ways that best protected the interests of their members. Some members were ẽager to break out of what they saw as thẽ confines of the state system and w, ere confident they would do well out of the new system. These members saw the unions as opposing new opportunities for them. Others with more modest ambitions sometimes clai~ed that the unions were more concerned with ~e problems of those without jobs at the expense of getting the best conditions for those still in jobs. Conversely, others whose jobs were lost lengthy process in which the opportunities for delay, diversion, sabotage or plain nondecision are endless. Members, or more accurately activists, are in a . much less subordinate position than their counterparts in companies. They may resist official objectives once decided and agitate for change. There is no readily available means of disciplining them for this since resistance is tolerated in principle if not welcomed in practice, and there are few sanctions available to senior union personnel with which to compel activist compliance since neither their jobs nor their future careers depend on union personnel. Thus in a process of radical change such as corporatisation, management is strategically better placed than unions to set objectives quickly and compel their achievement. This is especially so when, as with corporntisation, it is a management-initiated process of change from which unions were largely · excluded and which cut across membership solidarity.
Conclusions
Corporatisation proceeded at a rem. arkable pace. It took only 16 months from the frrst policy statement in December 1985 to the operation of the new corporations in April 1987. Restructuring by the corporations since then has maintained the relentless impetus for change. The impact upon individuals and communities has been dramatic . . At an organisational level, unions and the SOEs have had to shape a new relationship under vastly altered circumstances from those that prevailed before. This process is very much in its infancy. The crucial issue in this period has been the struggle for power and control. The SOEs have enjoyed structural and contextual advantages and have made significant advances. The capacity of the unions to reverse those advances depends on the balance of economic and political forces, not least of which is privatisation. There is little in t.hc broad context that gives reason to expect a reversal of present trends in the industrial relations of the SOEs. Thus any significant recovery by unions is likely to depend on organisational factors, especially industrial strength, cohesion, solidarity and leadership. These qualities are not evenly distributed and they are not easily brought to bear on all issues. Therefore, there is Hkely to be an uneven pattern of development in the mediumtenn future; the days of unifonnity appear to be finished. Basil Black-well · Journals Dept., 108 Cowley Road, Oxford ÕX4 1 JF or Journals Dept., Box 1320, Murray Hill Station, NY 1 0156, USA.
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